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Abstract 
 
Acquisition activity in the United States has occurred in three distinct waves.  During the 1960s, 
acquisitions were predominantly made in areas unrelated to the acquiring firms.  Later analysis of 
this conglomerate boom generally indicated that little or no shareholder value was created in this 
process.  A second wave of acquisition and divestiture activity in the 1980s was characterized by 
the unwinding of the conglomerates and a search for synergy between the buyer and the acquired 
firm.  The evidence on value creation for this period is somewhat more encouraging, although 
most studies indicate that firms did not succeed in creating profits through acquisitions.  A third 
wave of acquisitions occurred in the late 1990s.  This was an unprecedented era of merger and 
acquisition activity.  Nearly $4 trillion worth of mergers occurred from 1998-2000.  This 
represents a volume of activity greater than the previous 30 years put together.  This study 
examines the returns to acquiring firms during this period and compares them to previous studies 
of acquisition performance.  Was it different this time?  This study indicates that shareholder 
value was generally reduced in making acquisitions, although some factors can mitigate the 
degree of poor performance.  On average, acquiring firms lost 4-7% from making acquisitions.  
There is evidence to support the conventional wisdom that firms often overpay making 
acquisitions and that the size of the stock premium can be tied to firm performance.  However, 
after controlling for the price premium, there is significant evidence of wealth creation (synergy) 
from the transaction. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
n historic boom in merger and acquisition activity occurred in the 1990’s.  Nearly $4 trillion worth 
of mergers occurred during the three-year period of 1998-2000.  This represents a volume of activity 
greater than the previous 30 years put together.  The 1990’s included several of the largest deals of 
all time, including the $166 billion purchase of Time Warner by AOL in January, 2000.  These deals were part of 
the third major wave of acquisitions in this century.  During the 1960s, acquisitions were predominantly made in 
areas unrelated to the acquiring firms.  Later analysis of this conglomerate boom generally indicated that little or no 
shareholder value was created in this process.  A second wave of acquisition and divestiture activity in the 1980s 
was characterized by the unwinding of the conglomerates and a search for synergy between the buyer and the 
acquired firm.  Studies of this period show somewhat more promising results for value creation, although the 
evidence is mixed.  It appeared that most of the gains from these transactions were captured by the shareholders of 
the acquired firms.  The latest wave of mergers and acquisitions can be characterized as very large deals that were 
fueled by a healthy stock market and low interest rates.  The availability of easy money made it possible to acquire 
firms of virtually any size.  This study examines the returns to acquiring firms during this period and compares them 
to previous studies of acquisition performance. 
 
 The strategy of creating value through mergers and acquisitions has many skeptics.  A long series of studies 
of acquisition performance has cast doubt on the performance of acquisitions (Jensen, 1988).  In approximately two 
thirds of all deals, the stock price of the acquiring firm falls immediately after the announcement is made (Rappaport 
and Sirower, 1999).  This had led many researchers to conclude that acquiring firms are unlikely to create sufficient 
synergy in the transaction to compensate for the large stock premium that is generally required (Porter, 1987).  As a 
result, it appears that most of the gains from an acquisition flow to the shareholders of the acquired firms.  There is 
A 
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evidence that firms with greater experience at acquisitions tend to do somewhat better (Lubatkin, 1983) and that 
acquisitions in related industries are more likely to create synergy and positive returns to the acquiring firm 
(Halebian and Finkelstein, 1999). Other factors which influence value creation include acquisition target size 
(Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983), deal structure (Travlos, 1987; Datta, Narayanan, and Pinches, 1992), tax law 
considerations (Wansly, Lane, and Yang, 1983), organizational learning (Hayward, 2002), acquirer slack (Hitt, 
1993), and degree of consensus about the deal (Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, 1993; 
Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994).  Although there is considerable diversity in the methodology and hypotheses of 
previous studies, the predominant finding is that acquisition activity often leads to a wealth transfer from the buying 
firm to the shareholders of the acquired firm.  This conclusion raises fundamental doubt about the attractiveness of 
acquisitions as a strategic tool.  This study analyzes the performance of large acquisitions during the period 1995-
2000 to see if earlier conclusions about the effectiveness of acquisition strategies still seem valid. 
 
2.  Hypotheses And Methodology 
 
 This study is based on a sample of 302 mergers and acquisitions that occurred from 1995-2000.  The 
volume of activity during this period was six times greater than any five year period in history.  The average deal 
was also quite large.  For this sample, the average transaction was over $7 billion.  During previous periods of 
history, an acquisition of this size would have been considered enormous. Most of the deals could be characterized 
as related acquisitions.  Over 50% of the transactions occurred within the same 4 digit SIC code.  
 
 Acquisition performance was calculated using the abnormal returns methodology commonly used in event 
studies.  This form of analysis assumes that markets are informationally efficient and that the stock price reaction to 
an announced acquisition will quickly reflect all known information about the likely success.  Elton and Gruber 
(1987) review over 100 studies using this approach and conclude that price adjustments occur rapidly and 
efficiently. In this study, abnormal returns were calculated as: 
 
Rit = aj iRmt 
 
The returns on stock (i) in period (t) will be equal to a constant (aj) plus the return on a market portfolio (Rmt) times 
the beta (a measure of nondiversifiable risk) of stock (i).  The abnormal returns were calculated for a window 
extending from one week immediately preceding to one week after the acquisition announcement.  Earlier studies 
have concluded that stock price adjustments occur very rapidly following acquisition announcements, generally 
within one day (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).   
 
 The overall performance of the acquisitions in this study is consistent with earlier research.  On average, 
acquiring firms lost 4.2% of their value following the acquisition announcement.  The results are much more 
encouraging for the shareholders of the acquired firms.  On average, they realized a gain of 19.3%.  The earlier 
pattern of wealth transfer in acquisitions appears to hold true for the wave of very large transactions that occurred 
from 1995-2000.  This study also analyzed the determinants of acquisition performance.  In particular, the study 
investigated the role of the stock price premium, business relatedness, deal size, and seller returns in determining the 
performance of acquiring firms.   
 
 The conventional wisdom regarding acquisitions is that they frequently fail because buyers pay too much 
(Business Week, 2002).  The purchase price almost always includes a substantial premium over the existing 
valuation of target firms.  If markets are efficient, this extra cost must be recouped in the form of synergy or other 
type of value creation that must occur after the deal is consummated.  Earlier work by Jemison and Sitkin (1986) 
suggests that the escalating momentum of making a deal may lead to higher bids than can be justified by the 
characteristics of the target firm.  For the firms in this sample, the average stock price premium was 19%.  This 
creates a substantial burden for the acquiring firm to overcome.  The negative reaction by the market to acquisition 
announcements is evidence that firms are not expected to be able to achieve this feat.  This leads to the hypothesis 
that: 
 
H1:  Buyer returns will be negatively correlated with size of acquisition premium. 
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 The size of the transaction can also affect acquisition performance.  Earlier studies have found that large 
acquisitions in related industries can produce positive returns through the mechanism of increasing the market share 
of the acquiring firm (Chichester, 1996).  However, a countervailing effect may be the difficulties of integrating a 
large acquisition into the operations of an existing firm.  Other studies have indicated that the post-acquisition 
hurdles to combining operations can negate the potential synergies (De Noble, Gustafson and Hergert, 1988).  The 
impact of size is particularly interesting for this sample given the extremely large average deal size.  This study 
addressed this issue by testing the hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Buyer returns will be positively correlated with transaction size. 
 
 The business relatedness of the target firm to the acquiring firm can be an important determinant of 
performance.  Previous studies have generally found that acquisitions in related industries are more likely to succeed 
due to the greater prospects for operational synergy (Chichester, 1996). The conglomerate acquisitions of the 1960s 
have been largely discredited as failing to create shareholder value.  The sample used in this study contains a 
mixture of related and unrelated acquisitions.  Approximately 56% of the acquisitions in the sample occurred in the 
same 4 digit SIC code and were classified as related acquisitions.  This study will test the hypothesis that: 
 
H3: Buyer returns will be higher for related acquisitions. 
 
 This study also examined the relationship of seller returns to buyer returns.  An acquisition need not lead to 
a wealth transfer from one group of shareholders to another.  A successful acquisition can be a positive sum 
transaction that creates value for both parties.  The terms of the deal (in particular the price premium) may determine 
which group captures the majority of the benefits.  However, it is useful to distinguish between the value created in 
the acquisition and the distribution of the benefits.  In order to do this, this study examined the relationship between 
seller and buyer returns.  After controlling for purchase price, there could be a positive relationship (value creation) 
between buyer and seller returns if the deal produces greater competitive strength and synergy.  The presence of a 
positive relationship does not mean that the shareholders of the acquiring firm will necessarily benefit from the deal.  
That will depend on the price paid and the effectiveness of realizing potential synergies.  The test hypothesis is: 
 
H4:  Buyer returns will be positively correlated with seller returns. 
 
3.  Findings 
 
 The determinants of acquisition performance were analyzed using least squares regression.  The dependent 
variable was buyer abnormal returns for the period from one week prior to the acquisition announcement to one 
week after (BUYER).  The independent variables were seller abnormal returns (SELLER), stock price premium 
(PREMIUM), size of transaction (SIZE), and business relatedness (RELATE).  Size of transaction was measured as 
the dollar price paid for the target firm.  Business relatedness was a binary variable that was assigned a value of 1 if 
both firms were in the same 4 digit SIC code industry and 0 if not.  The results are shown below in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
Model 1 Constant Seller Premium Size Relate
 
R
2 
       
BUYER -.0715 .173 -.0013 .0000031 .055  
 (2.39)* (2.24)* (2.07)* ( .27) (2.01)* .223 
Model 2       
       
BUYER -.073 .174 -.0013  .054 .215 
 (2.54)* (2.27)* (2.07)*  (2.00)*  
       
Note: t statistics in parentheses   
* indicates significance at 95% 
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 The statistics in Table 1 are generally in support of the hypotheses described previously.  As found in 
earlier studies, it appears that buyer returns are higher when both firms are in the same industry.  This supports the 
notion that operating synergies and competitive strength can be enhanced through horizontal integration.  It is also 
clear that buyer returns are reduced by higher stock price premiums.  This supports the conventional wisdom that 
firms can undermine the potential effectiveness of an acquisition by paying too much.  However, it appears that the 
wealth transfers in this sample were limited to the stock price premium.  After controlling for the premium, it 
appears that seller returns are positively correlated with buyer returns.  This suggests that the transactions did create 
shareholder value.  Finally, there was no evidence of a size effect.  The SIZE variable was uncorrelated with buyer 
returns.  It is possible that the countervailing effects described earlier were both present and canceled each other out.   
In light of the enormous average size of the transactions in this sample, it is interesting that these megamergers did 
not result in a significant impact one way or the other.   
 
 The pace of acquisition activity has slowed considerably since the year 2000.  The capital market 
conditions that fueled this boom have changed dramatically.  For the foreseeable future, many of the organizations 
that participated in these deals will face significant challenges in restructuring their operations to make sense of the 
radical changes that these transactions created. The empirical evidence from this study is quite consistent with 
finding from the previous waves of acquisitions and does not provide much optimism for the likely success of these 
deals.  Only time will tell whether or not this latest wave of activity will ultimately prove profitable for the firms that 
participated.   
 
4.  References 
 
1. Asquith, P., Bruner, R., and D. Mullins, “The gains to bidding firms from merger”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1983, 11: 121-139. 
2. Brickley, J., J. Coles, and R. Terry, “Outside directors and adoption of poison pills”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1994, 35: 371-90. 
3. Business Week, “Mergers: Why most deals don’t pay off”, October 14, 2002. 
4. Datta, D., Narayanan, V. K., and G. Pinches, “Factors influencing wealth creation from mergers and 
acquisition: a meta-analysis”, Strategic Management Journal, 1992, 13: 67-84. 
5. Elton, E. and M. Gruber, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, New York: Wiley, 1987. 
6. Haleblian, J. and S. Finkelstein, “The influence of organizational acquisition experience on acquisition 
performance: A behavioral perspective”, Administrative Science Quarterly, March, 1999. 
7. Hayward, M., “When do firms learn from their acquisition experience?”, Strategic Management Journal, 
January, 2002. 
8. Hitt, M., Harrison, J., Ireland, D., “Lifting the veil of success in mergers and acquisitions”, paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the Strategic Management Society, 1993. 
9. Jemison, D. and S. Sitkin, “Corporate acquisitions: A process perspective”, Academy of Management 
Review, 1986, 11(1): 145-163. 
10. Jensen, M., “Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(2), 1988, 
21-48. 
11. Lubatkin, M., and S. Chatterjee, “Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firm”, Academy of 
Management Review, 1983, 8: 218-235. 
12. Mallette, P. and K. Fowler, “Effects of board composition and stock ownership on the adoption of poison 
pills”, Academy of Management Journal, 1992, 35: 1010-1035. 
13. Porter, M., Puffer, S. and J. Weintrop, “From competitive advantage to corporate strategy”, Harvard 
Business Review, 1987, 65: 43-60. 
14. Rappaport, A. and M. L. Sirower, “Stock or Cash?”, Harvard Business Review, 77(6), 1999, 147-58. 
15. Ross, S., R. Westerfield, and B. Jordan, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 1993, Boston, Irwin. 
16. Wansley, J., Lane, W., and H. Yang, “Abnormal returns to acquired firms by type of acquisition and 
method of payment”, Financial Management, 1983, 12: 16-22. 
